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Reconfiguring Social Security for
the 21st Century
It is well accepted that the Social
Security system will need reform when
the baby boomers begin to retire-but
how best to change this most successful
program? This article looks at several
models for reforming Social Security
for the next century.
By Susan A. ChannickT .he Old-Age, Survivors' and Disability
Insurance program (OASDI)' of the
Social Security system is a mandatory
social insurance program with a dual
purpose: to replace income lost to eligi-
ble workers due to retirement and to provide a
safety net against impoverishment for the most vul-
nerable of these retired workers. These two goals
are often described as individual equity-i.e.,
ensuring that participants get a fair rate of return
on their lifetime contributions to the system-and
social adequacy or progressivity-i.e., ensuring
every person's access to certain basic services
through redistribution of contributions.'
Social Security, by all accounts, has been a
tremendous success. It provides benefits to 44 mil-
Susan A. Channick is professor of law at California
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lion Americans who are elderly, disabled, and sur-
vivors of deceased workers. Without Social
Security, half the elderly would live in poverty.' The
program has been immensely popular, particularly
among the elderly-so popular, in fact, that politi-
cians identify it as the third rail of American poli-
tics: "Touch it and you die." 4 Because of the nature
of funding the system, current recipients of Social
Security benefits have enjoyed unusually high rates
of return on their "investment."' This perception
has perpetuated a sense in this generational cohort
that Social Security is an inviolate entitlement. This
position, in turn, has helped to create the stereo-
type of the aged as greedy, politically powerful, and
selfish and has fueled an inevitable intergenera-
tional conflict for limited resources.
The Pay-as-You-Go Model
The cash benefits paid to eligible retirees7 are fund-
ed from current payroll taxes,' not from a prefund-
ed so-called Social Security trust fund." The pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) model that has characterized the
program since its inception in 1935" depends for
its survival on a payroll tax base that does not fall
below the value of benefits promised to eligible
retirees and their derivative beneficiaries." As long
as contributions from current workers subject to
payroll taxes exceed or at least equal unfunded
benefits promised to eligible retirees,' the tax-ben-
efits relationship creates an upright pyramid that is
the hallmark of the PAYG model.
Currently, the PAYG system is operating at a
surplus;14 the excess taxes over benefits accumula-
tion make up a small "trust fund" that is invested
in federal government bonds. These bonds create
obligations in the federal government to the
OASDI program that will be used to satisfy future
benefit payments to eligible retirees. Since the
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bonds represent a past accumulation of payroll
taxes, they can properly be considered a prefunded
Social Security trust fund that will, to some extent,
offset future PAYG benefits needs. In addition,
while the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA) payroll tax-benefits relationship yields a
surplus, the temporary effect of this surplus is a
reduction in the federal deficit.15
For a number of well-identified reasons, the
current PAYG model is projected to fail around
2012 when the payroll tax revenues from the cur-
rent workforce will no longer exceed benefits oblig-
ations to eligible retirees. At that time, the system
will be operating at a deficit, and the federal gov-
ernment will be required to raise additional rev-
enue in order to fund the trust fund.'" It is this pro-
jected reversal of the tax-benefits pyramid that con-
cerns economists, politicians, and those eligible
workers relying on Social Security benefits to at
least partially fund their retirement. At that time,
the current PAYG model will no longer be able to
provide benefits previously promised to eligible
retirees without a concomitant increase in taxes,
reduction and/or delay in benefits, or other major
overhaul of the system.
A cogent question is why a model that has been
fundamentally successful for 65 years will not be
able to sustain its success at meeting the retirement
needs of aging Americans into the 21st century.
The primary reason is attributed to what is popu-
larly known as the baby boom generation.
Identified as those persons born between 1946 and
1964, this generation represents an aberrant popu-
lation cohort relative to the prior and subsequent
U.S. fertility rate, which had stabilized around
1920 at 2.1 and has since dropped significantly.
The current PAYG Social Security model is an
upright pyramid that relies on payroll taxes in
excess of benefits to work. The baby boomers rep-
resent a bulge in the U.S. population on both ends
of the curve; the critical factor is that this genera-
tion has not restabilized the previous U.S. fertility
rate of 2.1 and indeed has not even replaced itself.
When the first of the baby boomers retire at age 62
in 2012, the Social Security pyramid will necessar-
ily invert because benefits will exceed contribu-
tions.7 According to projections, in 2030, when all
of the boomers have reached age 65, Social Security
will be running an annual cash deficit of $766 bil-
lion. "
In addition to the sheer numbers of the baby
boom generation, another factor is the increased
life expectancy of American adults since 1935.
First, more workers are surviving to retirement. In
1940, only 53.9 percent of eligible men reached
retirement age, compared with 72.3 percent in
1990; for women the figure rose from 60.6 percent
to 83.6 percent. 9 Second, once reaching retirement,
workers are living longer, thereby increasing their
burden on the system. For example, the average life
expectancy of men following retirement rose from
12.7 to 15.3 years between 1940 and 1990, while
the average life expectancy of women during the
same period rose from 14.7 to 19.6 years. 20
Early Retirement
Yet another force putting a strain on the current
PAYG model is the increase in the retired popula-
tion due to earlier retirement. In 1950, the average
age for first receipt of Social Security benefits was
68.7 for men and 68.0 for women; in 1991, the
average first benefits receipt ages were 63.7 and
63.5, respectively.21 These statistics seem to demon-
strate that Americans are retiring earlier. By taking
itself out of the workforce, this new retired cohort
puts a dual strain on the system both by reducing
the overall contributions of the current working
population and by increasing the demand on the
benefits side of the PAYG equation.
There is much literature to support the argu-
ment that the structure of the current Social
Security system discourages the elderly from work-
ing beyond age 62, the age at which workers are
first eligible to receive benefits.22 A worker who
elects to retire and receive benefits prior to age 65
is entitled to receive benefits that are permanently
decreased as a result of electing early retirement.
While the policy of permanently decreased benefits
should have the effect of persuading potential ben-
eficiaries to continue to work until age 65, in fact
many eligible persons do retire early in the belief
that the increase in benefits from continuing to
work may not adequately compensate them for a
year of forgone benefits.24 Since the reduction is
arrived at actuarially, there should be no direct
benefit to early retirement; however, the indirect
effects of early retirement can more than offset the
reduction.2 s
In addition to the actual net effect of early
retirement on income is the well-accepted percep-
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tion that early retirement has a positive net effect
on return. 6 Because people regularly assume for
themselves a shorter rather than a longer life
expectancy, the perception is that retiring early is
economically preferable to waiting until normal
retirement age." This perception acts as a disincen-
tive for people to continue working, thus accelerat-
ing the inversion of the tax-benefits pyramid.
Even those workers who elect normal retire-
ment age over early retirement have further disin-
centives to work past age 65. First, the Social
Security benefit formula is designed to achieve a
balance between the program's twin goals: old-age
insurance and social welfare. 28 To achieve both
goals, the benefit formula reduces the payroll tax-
benefits rate of return for certain workers in order
to augment the benefits of other workers." In order
to accomplish this redistributive function, Social
Security has always operated on a defined benefit
model.30 Since a worker's earnings are not segregat-
ed into private accounts payable only to that work-
er, contributions in excess of the amount necessary
to comprise the highest possible benefit for that
worker are, at least personally, unproductive.
The primary insurance amount (PIA) is the
amount that a worker is entitled to upon retiring at
normal retirement age. Although the PIA is related
to a worker's contributions, the social welfare or
adequacy value of the system dictates that the rela-
tionship be less than complete. In order to accom-
plish its redistributive effect, the PIA is formulated
to provide a less than 100 percent rate of return on
a worker's contributions. For example, for a single
worker who turned 62 in 1996, the rate of return
on the first $10,000 of taxable wages was 62 per-
cent, while the rate of return on taxable wages in
excess of $60,000 was 29 percent. For highearn-
ing workers, the Social Security system provides lit-
tle incentive to continue to work beyond normal
retirement age, both because FICA only taxes the
first $68,400 (in 1998) of income and because the
rate of return on taxed income decreases signifi-
cantly as the amount of taxed income increases.
The system does provide a "delayed retirement
credit" incentive for persons who defer receipt of
their benefits after normal retirement age. For each
year of deferral until age 70, the recipient can
increase his or her benefit by a stated percentage
authorized by the statute. 2 Presently, the delayed
retirement credit of 5 percent is not actuarially fair
and therefore does not compensate a worker for a
year of forgone benefits." In addition, workers
who elect this option remain subject to both pay-
roll and income taxes, which may completely offset
the economic incentive to forgo retirement benefits.
Second, the formula for computing a worker's
benefit is based on the worker's highest 35 years of
wage-indexed earnings." Unless a worker's post-65
earnings subject to FICA are substantially higher
than his or her prior years' earnings or the worker
has not worked 35 qualifying years at the time the
benefit computation is made, there is no concomi-
tant increase in benefit for working more than 35
years prior to retirement.
Third, persons are penalized in a number of
ways when they continue to perform compensated
work while receiving retirement benefits. Social
Security imposes a "retirement earnings" test that
limits the amount of earnings a retiree can have
before benefits are reduced." It is important to note
that the retirement earnings test looks exclusively
to income derived from performing personal ser-
vices. Strangely, it does not include income from
other sources such as interest, dividends, rents,
annuities, pension plan distributions, or capital
gains.
Additionally, all persons, regardless of age,
whose employment is covered by Social Security
are subject, either directly or indirectly, to current
Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes of 12.4
percent and 2.9 percent, respectively. So persons
eligible for Social Security benefits free of payroll
taxes who instead elect to continue working also
continue to be subject to this 15.3 percent tax on
earnings. Ironically, persons who elect to receive
retirement benefits but whose income exceeds the
applicable excess earnings thresholds are subject to
payroll taxes on the excess earnings. The double
penalty of a $1 to $2 or a $1 to $3 reduction in
Social Security benefits, coupled with a payroll tax
on the excess earnings, may act as a disincentive to
continued employment to all but high-earning eli-
gible beneficiaries.
Proposals for Reform
A New Model for the 21st Century
Given these facts, it seems quite clear that in order
for the system to continue into the 21st century,
reform is necessary. The dominant policy response
of the 20th century has been to raise the payroll tax
in order to continue to support the unfunded pay-
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roll tax-benefits model. Beginning in 1937, the
combined payroll tax for employers and employees
was 2 percent on wages up to $3,000, which rose
to 3 percent on wages up to $3,500 by 1951. By
1997, the combined tax was 10.52 percent on
wages up to $65,400 for old-age insurance. In
1956, Congress added a disability program to
Social Security with its own payroll tax. By 1998,
the combined payroll tax for old-age insurance and
disability was 12.4 percent on wages up to
$68,400. In addition, Medicare, enacted in 1965,
has its own payroll tax of 2.9 percent of all wages. 6
As late in the century as 1983, President Ronald
Reagan and Congress "rescued" Social Security
with a bipartisan $168 billion package in which an
increase in the payroll tax played a central role.
Certainly, one way in which Social Security can
be again rescued for future generations of benefi-
ciaries is to continue the current policy into the
21st century. There are those who believe that an
approximately 2 percent increase in the payroll tax
would take care of the problem for the next 75
years. This solution, while it could temporarily
close the projected payroll tax-benefits shortfall
and postpone a budget deficit, does not change the
current PAYG model. And if PAYG is destined to
continuously fall short as long as the payroll tax-
benefits pyramid remains inverted, merely raising
the payroll tax is not enough.
There are a number of other problems with this
solution. First, it increases an already regressive
tax, the direct effect of which is likely to be dispro-
portionately harsh on low-earning workers.
Second, the increase again is just a stopgap mea-
sure. As Michael Boskin has noted, the modest
adjustments made in 1983 were calculated to cre-
ate a solvent system for 75 years. He predicts that
to put Social Security in actuarial balance requires
an immediate 5 percent tax increase, more if the
increase is delayed.38 Third, a tax increase would be
politically difficult to achieve in a time when the
general public is convinced that Social Security is
flush with surplus.
Fourth, raising the payroll tax (or decreasing
benefits) has the effect of lowering workers' rates
of return from the system. This consideration is one
of both economics and politics. The PAYG
approach of the past century depends for its success
on contributions exceeding benefits. It has worked
because, although the payroll tax was relatively
low while the return on investment was relatively
high, it was a politically popular and supportable
model. However, as the tax has increased and the
rate of return decreased, this model is likely to lose
some of its popularity and its political constituen-
cy." Last, raising payroll taxes only maintains the
status quo-an unfunded PAYG defined benefit
system-without any real change in the existent
system. While there is always some appeal to stasis,
this remedy has been tried often enough in the past
so that its effectiveness has been well tested and
documented.
Although there seems to be some consensus that
continuing with the reform policy of the 20th cen-
tury is inapt,40 there is little consensus as to what
reform is apt for the new millennium.41 There cer-
tainly are strong constituencies on both ends of the
reform continuum, from those advocating more
modest reforms to those suggesting wholesale
changes to the existing system.42 Those who sup-
port retooling the current system rather than
replacing it are motivated at least to some degree
by the importance of the social protection value of
the current system, which has relied on redistribu-
tion of contributions into benefits. This constituen-
cy advocates such changes as reducing benefits,
increasing the payroll tax base, adding progressivi-
ty to the system by taxing Social Security benefits
like other retirement benefits, and otherwise creat-
ing incentives for workers, particularly high earn-
ers, to continue working instead of electing retire-
ment at normal retirement age.
The Prefunded Model
A less modest but not overly controversial reform
advocated by a number of constituencies involves
changing Social Security from the traditional PAYG
model to a prefunded model. This suggestion takes
many forms, but the underlying rationale is the
same. While a PAYG model had much value partic-
ularly during the early- to mid-20th century, in
order to create a popular and immediate income
replacement and insurance program at a time when
contributions to the system consistently exceeded
benefits to retirees, the good reasons for an institu-
tionalized shift of assets from workers to their aged
parents may no longer be so compelling.43 First,
poverty among the elderly has been significantly
reduced.' In addition, the elderly cohort is eco-
nomically varied; no one set of adjectives describes
the entire population. Second, there is some evi-
dence that at least some of the baby boom genera-
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tion, responding to a shaken public confidence in
the ability of the Social Security system to fund its
retirement, has saved privately through such vehi-
cles as private pension plans and IRAs.45 If this is
true, the need to have a younger generation dispro-
portionately burdened to support it is diminished.
Various reform proposals include prefunding.
One possible approach, modeled on the existing
system, would prefund a single government-man-
aged defined benefit trust fund by raising the pay-
roll tax a small amount and allowing the trust fund
to invest the increase in common stock funds rather
than restricting the contribution investment to gov-
ernment bonds.4 6 This mandatory payroll tax
increase would create forced savings47 and make
benefits more affordable in the long run. If equities
continue, as they have, to outperform the bond
market, the long-term solvency of the trust fund
could be restored.
Under the PAYG model, payroll taxes collected
from current workers are paid out immediately in
benefits to eligible retirees; the only real investment
in government obligations is the surplus of tax in
excess of benefit. 49 The rate of return in a PAYG
system is what Martin Feldstein calls the "implicit"
rate of return, because there is no real investment."
Currently, the implicit rate of return has been cal-
culated at 2 percent per year due to both the
greater number of workers and their higher wages,
which, while not high, will offset the cost of bene-
fits to future generations."
The value of a prefunded model is a real rate of
return on the investment of that amount of payroll
contributions that equals forced savings." The
higher real rate of return reduces the payroll tax
contribution burden of younger generations for the
benefit of older generations. The sooner in time a
"savings" component of payroll tax is adopted, the
greater the generational equity because the work-
ing population will, at least to some extent, be sav-
ing for its own retirement." On the other hand,
generational inequity is at its highest in a pure
PAYG system where the payroll tax-benefits pyra-
mid has inverted.
The more recent addition to the prefunding dia-
logue is the current debate concerning how to allo-
cate the approximately $1 trillion budget surplus
projected to occur over the next 15 years.54 In his
January 19, 1999, State of the Union speech,
President Clinton proposed committing 60 percent
of the surplus for the next 15 years to Social
Security," a suggestion with which, in principle at
least, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan is in agreement.s' In addition, many pol-
icymakers and legislators on both sides of the polit-
ical and economic debate agree, again at least in
principle, with the concept of allocating some of
the surplus to prefund Social Security's future
obligations." The point of real departure is
whether wholesale changes need to be made to the
fundamental structure of the system.
The Privatization Model
Whereas President Clinton's USA, or universal sav-
ings account, plan is based on stimulating private
savings to pay for what have heretofore been pub-
lic entitlements, proposals for privatizing the
entire system are much more revolutionary.9 These
more controversial reform proposals dictate mov-
ing from the current defined benefit model to a
defined contribution model so that the return on
investment more closely approximates many pri-
vate pension plans, the so-called privatization
model. However, the correlative effect of such a
paradigm shift could threaten the value of social
protection that has been so successful in reducing
poverty and insecurity among the elderly.60 The
hallmark of the defined contribution model is that
a worker's rate of return or benefit from the system
equals his or her lifetime contributions plus
growth. Integral to defined contribution proposals
is the privatization portion, i.e., the worker's right
to self-direct his or her own investments with an
ability to invest in private debt and equity instru-
ments.
There are a number of so-called privatization
proposals floating around; all share the concept of
earmarking at least some percentage of a current
worker's payroll tax to go to individual accounts to
be used for income replacement at retirement."
Privatizing would certainly improve the rate of
return for individuals, particularly high-earning
workers, by the use of a defined contribution
model invested in private debt and equity instru-
ments. Workers who start contributing early
enough in their working lifetimes can take advan-
tage of real rates of return on investments. Where,
however, does this leave those workers whose ben-
efits have already accrued under the existing
defined benefit PAYG model? And, indeed, where
does this leave low-earning workers whose oppor-
tunity for a decent retirement was heretofore guar-
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anteed by the redistributive effect of the existing
social insurance model?
While privatization might create some benefits,
it is not without its problems. First, substituting a
defined contribution privatized model for the cur-
rent system is not the solution for the shortfall cre-
ated by already accrued Social Security liabilities.
Although this shortfall may be covered while the
surplus of contributions over benefits lasts, it seems
neither prudent or wise to assume a permanent sur-
plus.6 2 And once a budget surplus can no longer be
relied on to cover already accrued benefit liabilities,
the system becomes PAYG with respect to those lia-
bilities. Second, many privatization proposals
advocate using the budget surplus to prefund indi-
vidual accounts, leaving already accrued liabilities
to continue to be funded on a PAYG basis either
from an increase in payroll taxes or from an allo-
cation of general revenues.
Third, while privatization can reward the
informed and fortunate investor, it creates market
risks that many workers can ill afford and may
indeed be unprepared to take. To the extent that
high-earning workers might be more willing and
able to tolerate risk than low-earning workers, the
fairness or progressivity value of Social Security has
been eroded. One way to maintain fairness and
progressivity while increasing the rate of return is
to privatize the public trust fund, i.e., to allow
OASDI trust funds to invest some portion of pay-
roll tax in private equity and debt instruments
instead of government bonds. The problems inher-
ent in that approach have been pointed out by
numerous politicians and economists, most notably
Alan Greenspan," although other entitlements
experts have made suggestions regarding methods
designed to insulate from abuse the investment of
such a huge public fund in private instruments.64
Last but perhaps not least, privatization in the
form of a defined contribution model dramatically
reconceives Social Security as a national retirement
income security system that guarantees both equity
and adequacy. Social Security is neither a private
pension plan nor a welfare program. It is intended
instead to provide a floor of protection to which
can be added private-sector income replacement
plans. As such, Social Security cannot sacrifice the
provision of socially adequate benefits for equi-
table benefits; both values must be protected."
These twin goals have been well served by a
defined benefit system that both redistributes con-
tributions and incorporates progressivity. It may be
that a defined contribution with a minimum bene-
fit guarantee model would equally well or better
serve the twin goals of income adequacy and
income equity, but replacing the old model with a
completely new one seems premature. There is
much room within the current system for compre-
hensive, multilateral retooling to meet the changing
needs of the 21st century. While there is certainly
consensus that the current system needs reform, it
is anything but clear that this reform should be rev-
olutionary. Now is the time to throw out the old
bathwater but keep the baby.
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